words of untrustworthy people, and in the note-taking, reporting and filing that produced the pieces of intelligence "gold" which could protect a threatened and frightened Restoration regime. It is this, ultimately, that is the real context of "Mrs Affora". In order to explore this world more fully, we must begin with the content of one of the more famous documents of Behn's espionage activities: the "Memorialls for Mrs Affora".
The "Memorialls"
The "Memorialls for Mrs Affora" is a copy of the instructions first given in around July 1666 to Aphra Behn. 6 The document is two pages long, broken into 14 numbered sections, and carefully written out in note form. There are some alterations, which suggests that, having been written down, they were read through and amended. This document must be an office copy of the instructions given to
Behn, for the original she presumably took with her and, as we shall see, they were not really intended for her alone.
In Restoration terms, a "memorial" meant a "note", a "memorandum" or, in its technical sense, an informal state paper, giving to an agent an account of a matter under discussion. The word "memorial" was also a preservative one: it sought to preserve memory and, by implication, indicated that something was worth remembering. This document was produced as part of the flow, or memory creation, of an early-modern administration-an administration, in this instance, organized by the men in the office of the Secretary of State for the purpose of covert intelligence. A memorial was not, though, just a reminder of what had been said, but was also a warrant for action, as can be seen, for instance, in a surviving manuscript relating to Behn's fellow spy, William Leving. The pass he was given to enable him to do his work includes the words: "This is to certify [… to] whome it shall concerne that the bearer hereof William Leving is emploid by mee and consequently not to be molested or restrained upon any search or enquiry". 7 The "Memorialls for Mrs Affora" was almost certainly preceded or accompanied by an oral briefing.
The document should therefore be understood not in isolation, but as connected to oral instructions indicating what Behn was to do. It also had a more thoroughgoing connection to an oral world beyond its textual form. 8 That oral culture of espionage action has largely been lost to us; indeed, the "winks and blinks" of espionage culture in part ensured that much evidence has disappeared.
Usually we have only the written outcomes, but we should not forget that this oral world existed. In interpreting the "Memorialls", we therefore need to read between the document's lines and see the signs of an oral debate-arguments conducted elsewhere between Arlington and Williamson and even perhaps the King, with their brokers Halsall and Killigrew, to whom Behn would later write. 9 The fact that the "Memorialls" document survives at all of course makes it unusual, but not unique.
Documents containing secret orders to the regime's other agents can be used for comparative purposes, showing that Behn's instructions were not atypical; the "Memorialls" indeed resonate with tropes and themes found elsewhere in intelligence texts. For instance, we have orders given to a domestic spy, who was "sent purposely [to be] inquisitive in inns and private houses, informing himself also of the opportunity to watch bridges, and to beat the highway at night". 10 Embedded here are some of the basic actions required of a spy-to be inquisitive, to watch, to work at night- An undated paper from 1666 also provides insight into the activities of the other side, in its instructions to Dutch spies operating in England. They were to discover the building rates of warships and the movements of merchant men, and were ordered to arrange correspondents to provide further information-mostly by recruiting old republican officers hostile to the Stuart regime.
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Some of the techniques used by agents of the government are indicated in A Brief Narrative of that Stupendious Tragedie, an account from 1662 by the agent William Hill recalling his own activities under instruction. Hill reports of the meetings he infiltrated: at "our Conference there was all of Gods Glory; in Zeal we were up to the Eyes; and I began exactly to speak their Language". 13 Just as
Behn was later advised to do, Hill adopted a role to gain information for his employers. In that same pamphlet, we also learn of Edward Riggs, who, according to one victim, was "continually at my shop,
and would not let me alone, prompting and inducing me to these things". 14 Here, Riggs's "prompting" was his key technique-asking loaded questions to provoke answers and draw in his targets. Immoral, certainly, but in the same pamphlet Sir Orlando Bridgeman noted on the use of spies:
where there are works of darkness, these are things men will not do by daylight but in darkness, and who can discover these works of darkness better than they that have to do with them, if God turn their hearts.
15
The 14 numbered sections of the "Memorialls" are grouped into three underlying parts. 16 Secrecy was crucial, though there is evidence in the correspondence which followed that Behn did not fully grasp the significance at this point. 17 Intelligence texts such as the "Memorialls" and, indeed, Behn's correspondence to the secretariat have often been used to titillate through the very idea of the secret. This characterizes not only the Restoration use of them (they, too, liked the idea of secrecy), but also marks present-day responses to intelligence matters, with the result that secrecy is the prism through which the material is seen.
Readers today want such documents to reveal the past's underlying purposes by containing juicy secrets. This urge, for all its psychological appeal, inevitably distorts the texts, and distracts attention from their real tropes and themes, for such documents are actually replete with familiar rhetorical strategies. They sought to engage their reader; they display ideas of reliability or authority (possibly as a sleight of hand, since participants tended to be neither reliable nor truthful); they carried warnings; they threatened; and they even, occasionally, contained praise. Only embedded within such textual strategies are the real nuggets of fact. Maintaining good continuity and connectivity was essential in this espionage world, so these texts also tend to emphasize date and place in order to bring apparent certainty, and they naturally encouraged reading between the lines, sometimes literally in the case of secret inks. Lastly, these documents provide insight into the dynamics of the social relationships between author and reader, and, somewhat surprisingly given the mental and physical violence of the espionage world, in many senses they demonstrate the operation of a culture of politeness.
Such intelligence texts' social form-their make-up-is actually closely similar to that of the open correspondence of the era, in that they share the fact of being sociotexts; in Gary Schneider's words, they are "collective social forms designed, understood, and expected to circulate within designated epistolary circles". 19 Whilst their "epistolary circles" were relatively limited, they aimed at the goals of other correspondence-at creating social connectivity and being part of a network of exchange. This focused on reciprocal news, or gossip, which could be open or covert and formed a pattern of exchange, with both a bargaining structure and a binding mechanism between its participants. The documents thereby formed a cycle of social and knowledge debt for all parties.
Spy and spymaster letters, therefore, should be understood in the context of the culture of clientpatron relationships, which themselves of course were based on reciprocal needs. The spy, like many a low-ranking courtier, was thus a supplicant, eagerly seeking a master's praise. This is the context for Behn's adoption of this pose in her correspondence when she seeks to gain money, place and status. 20 In general terms, the spy, by engaging in such correspondence at all, also seeks to borrow some of the glamour of their master's status. In effect, a spy could only report their intelligence if they were temporarily accepted on some level of parity by a patron. Meanwhile, a patron's willingness to indulge such people, and then to use their words in other more significant social and political situations, was equally status-driven. The information drawn by spymasters from their sources, often reprehensibly gathered (and espionage itself was morally unclean to many a gentleman), could only be socially cleansed by a temporary acceptance of the spy into a relationship; it could then enable the user to gain political advantage in the bear pit of court life. So this interchange of intelligence texts had a deeper purpose than mere covert knowledge: it was a social and cultural process. The information had to have its uses to both parties, and the idea of having secret knowledge produced potential advantage, giving both parties, in their respective spheres, the chance to be noticed. 21 As a result, a dynamic of textual debt and credit is embedded within intelligence texts, building a relationship between sender and recipient, and requiring both sides to play their part in its continuance. In place of this convention, from the start, money looms large in Behn's correspondence, and we know that she faced financial problems almost from the beginning of her adventure. 22 This topic is not in itself surprising, as the English system was notoriously a poor payer of its agents. 23 For instance, Edward Riggs, once more, whose secret employment Joseph Williamson oversaw and whose career began in the aftermath of the 1662 plot, was sent into Holland as a spy in 1663. His correspondence indicates that he went with only £35, and he thereafter constantly bemoaned his lot, for, as he said, "Holland was a dear place". The following year (1664), his wages were raised to £40, yet he still faced financial problems, noting that a three-or four-roomed house cost 150 guilders to rent (about £15); that his spying trips cost him at least 20 guilders; and that "I must have victualls, which is dearest of all and cloathes […] £15 per annumn cannot do it". Riggs claimed he needed at least £100 to survive, even if he raised some additional funds by practising "phisick". 24 Such references to financial difficulties could only be effective if judiciously combined with the expected evocation of the patron-client relationship, but here is the voice of "Affora" in her correspondence as a client, seeking praise, power and status for her actions:
I am very un happy that tis not yet in my power to do som thing more then hether to I have dun: but I know you would not impute it to neglect if you knew how imposible it is yet for me to send: Mr Nypho & Sr Anthony who asit me wth theire best counsaile can wittness for me how hard a matter, tis yet to acomplish any thing. 25 Her pleading with her intelligence patrons for client indulgence, promising to do something more if fully supported, is in fact the main theme of her letters. This compounded a bad beginning in her relationship with them, a relation that shows signs of a breakdown early in the cycle familiar to readers of such texts. Instead of engaging in the invoking of patron-client relations that was essential to this kind of document, the majority of Behn's intelligence correspondence from Flanders strives to put herself at the centre of the discourse. In doing this, Behn produced a correspondence replete with detail and character studies worthy of the future playwright, but one that was far from the routine ends of intelligence-gathering. As the "Memorialls" show, she was sent not to make character studies, but to gain information from and about Scot. In this correspondence, we can see
Behn developing as a writer: she presents us with a heroine who comes unstuck, undermined by wicked men and poor advisors. This, however, relates her language in the documents more to court and dramatic conventions than to true intelligence practice, and it does not utilize the expected dynamics of spying texts. It was not that Behn did not produce some intelligence, but that her language did not follow the patterns expected of a true agent; eventually her appeal to Arlington in November 1666 with yet more pleas for support merely resulted in his orders for her to come home. Marshall, the agent in question here, teases his reader, John Thurloe, with intelligence facts and a few details that demand further questioning, thus ensuring the continuance of the correspondence and the client-patron link. He uses cloudy descriptions of the doings of the exiled court, implying that all of this was in some way significant. This relatively low-grade information would have been readily available from other sources, so the text's acceptability to its reader is not solely due to its content.
Its deployment of a charged intelligence rhetoric aims, above all, to continue the correspondence with his patron with as little cost as possible to the writer, and to hook his reader to ask for more information; he creates, as he writes, a sound relationship.
The "Memorialls for Mrs Affora" is a key witness to the activity that was set down by the Secretary of State's office in 1666 for Aphra Behn. How far she achieved those ends is thus very pertinent. In fact, Behn's mission, begun in July, was dead in the water by August, for the real problem was not only that she failed in playing her role; it was that, although the document was headed "Memorialls for Mrs Affora", the instructions were not actually aimed at Behn at all, but at the exiled William Scot.
Wartime contexts
The immediate context of the "Memorialls" was the Anglo-Dutch war. 29 By 1666, the Dutch regime was using the exiled republican community in the Netherlands and Flanders as stalking horses for an invasion of southern England. In England, the war had made the regime very nervous of republicans, and common fears in 1663-67 included the combination of a domestic rising with a Dutch invasion. If it is the case that Behn did not share her patrons' swift assessment of Scot's usefulness to them, she nonetheless drew attention to an aspect of his behaviour that is very interesting to present-day researchers of early-modern espionage. Behn shrewdly noted that he slipped into third-person formulations at times in his responses: he "spoke som times of himself as another person, & som times as him self". 32 Distancing oneself from such immoral activities seems to have been common amongst the "fragmented personalities" drawn into such a world. 33 Added to this was an earlymodern predilection for "performance and rhetoric" and disguise, a predilection that was a valuable asset for any spy. Yet Scot's actions revealed him as ultimately too chaotic and selfish to be of use, and his resort to the third person demonstrates a desire to distance himself from the texts he was helping to create: he was and was not acting in a mode of betrayal; he was frank but secretive, confident yet disconsolate. He craved acknowledgement and respect, but continued to justify his world view and his current double role.
William Scot was the son of Thomas Scot, the regicide who, ironically, had run the English Republic's intelligence system from 1649-53. 34 The Restoration regime had, somewhat brutally, interrogated
Thomas Scot before his execution in 1660 in order to extract his secrets. In itself, this would have been a sufficiently interesting background for the regime to try to recruit his son William, even though he was, unlike his father, of no particular prominence. He could also have been seen as a valuable intelligence asset due to his connections with the troublesome exiled community in the Netherlands post-1660 and, in particular, with Joseph Bampfield, a figure well known to both 42 While, clearly, Scot was seen as dangerous, the regime was still making a conscious effort to get hold of him and also, through him, to target Bampfield and other exiles assisting the Dutch. This was the mess into which Aphra Behn, the "shee-spy", armed with the "Memorialls", was sent with "her brother one Mr Cherry and her Mayd, her brother [… being] one of the Duke of Albermarle's guard". 43 Success was never particularly likely.
Women and espionage
There have always been people who find the idea of spying upon their fellows very appealing, and While espionage was predominantly a masculine world, there were women other than Aphra Behn who also entered it as a trade and, in a life of potential danger and violence (both physical and mental), there can have been few attractions to most early-modern women. Within the espionage world, too, they were significantly circumscribed by their gender identity, for the boundaries of moral propriety and economic opportunity were still clear, and women's status and roles in this covert community were conventionally lesser than those of men. Yet there are some other seventeenth-century examples who can serve as comparisons to the experiences of "Mrs Affora".
One unfortunate female spy from 1642, for instance, gives a clear example of the dangers of the trade and how transgressive women were thought to be if they engaged in it. 44 This nameless victim was caught by members of Essex's army and, at her first refusal to admit to her espionage role, her captors resorted to practices commonly associated with the treatment of witches: they tied a rope round her waist and plunged her in a river to force a confession. Taken half-drowned from the water, "she then confest she had been two moneths in the Kings Army, and had the constant pay of 
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Her Royalist activities had included ranging into the City of London to "heare how and which way the People stood affected". 46 Unlike a man in a similar position, however, once she had confessed she was shown very rough justice. The newsbook blandly records that "this being confessed, they kil'd her presently, and threw her Body backe into the River". 47 Other female spies operated out of London in the period, including a woman who worked there as "a spie or she-Intelligencer" for the Royalist camp at Oxford, whom one writer damned as "capable of doing as much mischief in that kind as any man whatsoever". 48 The sexual mores of the time might have prevented indecent searches of women of a certain class, with the result that, sometimes, women could cross enemy lines with rather more ease than men.
One of the "feminine Malignants and traitors" in Plymouth in 1644, however, was caught passing messages to the besiegers about the "store of Powder [there] was in the town". 49 Through her links outside the walls, she advised the besieging army where to strike, seeking only protection as her reward-like the biblical Rahab-should the army eventually break in. The fate of this "Virago", as the pamphleteer calls her, is not given, but it is unlikely to have been pleasant. 50 Meanwhile, Anne
Penyall, the wife of Matthew Penyall the younger, who had been a musician and "Singing-man of
Windsor castle", showed her loyalties by working with "Mistris Guy, a Proctors wife" at Oxford to set up an intelligence network; they armed themselves with passes to cross the battle lines "every way" said the newsletter Mercurius Civicus.
a man because her sex protected her from being searched indicates resentment at that advantage.
Indeed, we also learn the year before of "two young Cavaliers" who cross-dressed for this very purpose. They were caught on London's streets in 1643 dressed in the "habit of the Female sex", one "in a red Peticoate and Wastcoat and the other in a black Gowne". These "comelie Lasses" were "committed to prison till further examination". 52 During the 1650s, there were a number of Irishwomen, also, who were caught when engaged in message-carrying, and then tried and executed in Dublin: Anne Knowden, a "tory spie", and Joan Doyle were hanged in Dublin Corn Market by the English authorities. 53 Then, in 1655-56, Mary Sexby was used by her husband Edward Sexby, the Leveller, as a secret courier: she crossed the Channel "quilted all over the bodice of her gown with […] pistols [coins], one upon another near 1000", to provide money to the opponents of the Cromwellian regime. 54 Some years earlier, Catherine
Howard, the Royalist widow of Lord d'Aubigny, had involved herself in plots to seize London for the King, landing in the Tower for her pains; later, remarried, she was described as a "woman of very great wit, and most trusted and conversant in those intrigues". 55 Diana Gennings, the wife of Sir William Gennings of Essex, had a story that might have been a suitable case for Aphra Behn's drama had she been aware of it. 56 William had been 19 when he and Diana met, and was considered by his acquaintances and family as too young and naive to marry.
Perhaps they saw Diana as a low-born adventuress, which, as it turned out, she was. Faced with this opposition, the couple eloped to France and made their way to Antwerp, where they lived for a year and a half. Diana claimed to have been born in Flanders of a Hampshire soldier in Spanish service, and also that she was by birth a Stuart. Having married in haste, the couple soon seem to have fallen out, and Diana abandoned her husband to take up with Colonel Robert Phillips in 1655, either as his mistress or possibly because he saw her as a deserving cause. Diana was certainly adept at covering her tracks, now blithely informing Phillips's circle that she was the widow of Sir Thomas Stanley (she took to using Stanley as her second name). Phillips, a relative of the Earl of Ormond and associated with the household of the Duke of Gloucester, was Edward Hyde's "main intelligencer". 57 His wife was living in England and Flanders at the time, and she also played her part in his schemes, despite the recent death of their only son. 58 Diana, meanwhile, seems to have seen her new patron as another opportunity, as she watched, listened and infiltrated the Royalist plans not through any explicit political motive, but seemingly with an eye for the main chance.
One evening in Brussels, she was in company in a tavern, "the Emperatice". Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, she was a woman in whom Scot was interested. Clearly, as Behn noted, she "neither petitiond ffor nor desird the place", but ultimately the spymasters would use whomever they needed to. In this world, she was a convenient dupe for wider purposes.
Why, having got her out there and gone to all the trouble of obtaining her services, did the regime apparently ignore her many letters? The answer to this is that they did not, or at least that they ignored her letters no more than they did those of other agents of the era. Her letters ended up in the Secretary of State's office and they were undoubtedly examined. But Scot had already answered the questions in the "Memorialls" fairly early on, largely in negative terms, and everything else turned out to be mere straw intelligence in the wind. Additionally, it was a common practice to keep agents hanging on in suspense for any acknowledgement. 62 Lastly, although severely criticized by Behn and not a few others, Thomas Corney can still give us some hints as to where it all went wrong for her. First, he discovered the main reason for her coming over was to "speake with him [Scot] and as they tell mee with the knowledge of my Lord Arlington".
Second, Corney noted Behn had Arlington's pass: "I saw it". Given his history of conflict with Scot, Corney was naturally derogatory about him, noting he was of little use for "discover[ing] the designes of the fannatique party". Scot, he reports, was heavily "in debt" and, since "hee cannot speake 3 words of Dutch", would not be in a position to report much if "hee would goe into any Coffee Houses, or Tavarene to hear any newse, that being all the ways hee hath left to doe anything,
for De Witt will as soone entrust the Divell as him". 63 It was a combination of this information from Corney and Scot's own slipperiness in replies that led the regime to abandon the operation and leave Aphra Behn lodged at the Rose Noble in Antwerp-a "place where all the Hollanders come every day; and believe knoweth her business as well as her selfe"-and, it must be said, understandably floundering. 64 To Behn's moral credit, perhaps, one feels that Diana Gennings might have been rather more adept at working her way out of this appalling situation than was "Mrs Affora".
As to any neglect itself, we can return to Thomas Corney, a man whom Behn, taking her lead from Scot, grew to hate. He was not a loveable character, but he had served the Stuart cause since 1642, when the Queen Mother had asked him to obtain arms and ammunition for the royal army, to the loss of his trade; service in the royal army had followed and, in 1665, he was in the Netherlands playing the part of a spy when Scot betrayed him. Caught when the Buat affair broke out, his cover as a merchant was over, his business was ruined and, after six months' harsh treatment in prison, he was forced out of the Netherlands. It is little wonder that he was bitter when Behn turned up on her mission to gather information from and about Scot. Yet, when we pick up his story again in 1669, however things happen I shall ever acknowledge the favours received from you and the place shall be yors and I shall desire no more but to be stiled Sir your obedient servant. 65 This neglect was a poor reward for all of his services. And, in the end, this is also one of the major points about Aphra Behn in this espionage world: to us, she was and will become Aphra Behn the playwright; to them, she was merely "Mrs Affora" of the "Memorialls", to be used and discarded like many another secret agent of the day. 
